Introduction

As required by Section 595(c) of Title 28 of the United States Code, the Office of the Independent Counsel ("OIC" or "Office") hereby submits substantial and credible information that President William Jefferson Clinton committed acts that may constitute grounds for an impeachment.(1)

The information reveals that President Clinton:

The evidence shows that these acts, and others, were part of a pattern that began as an effort to prevent the disclosure of information about the President's relationship with a former White House intern and employee, Monica S. Lewinsky, and continued as an effort to prevent the information from being disclosed in an ongoing criminal investigation.

Factual Background

In May 1994, Paula Corbin Jones filed a lawsuit against William Jefferson Clinton in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.(2) Ms. Jones alleged that while he was the Governor of Arkansas, President Clinton sexually harassed her during an incident in a Little Rock hotel room.(3) President Clinton denied the allegations. He also challenged the ability of a private litigant to pursue a lawsuit against a sitting President. In May 1997, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the President's legal argument. The Court concluded that Ms. Jones, "[l]ike every other citizen who properly invokes [the District Court's] jurisdiction . . . has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims," and that therefore Ms. Jones was entitled to pursue her claims while the President was in office.(4) A few months later, the pretrial discovery process began.(5)

One sharply disputed issue in the Jones litigation was the extent to which the President would be required to disclose information about sexual relationships he may have had with "other women." Ms. Jones's attorneys sought disclosure of this information, arguing that it was relevant to proving that the President had propositioned Ms. Jones. The President resisted the discovery requests, arguing that evidence of relationships with other women (if any) was irrelevant.

In late 1997, the issue was presented to United States District Judge Susan Webber Wright for resolution. Judge Wright's decision was unambiguous. For purposes of pretrial discovery, President Clinton was required to provide certain information about his alleged relationships with other women. In an order dated December 11, 1997, for example, Judge Wright said: "The Court finds, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled to information regarding any individuals with whom the President had sexual relations or proposed or sought to have sexual relations and who were during the relevant time frame state or federal employees."(6) Judge Wright left for another day the issue whether any information of this type would be admissible were the case to go to trial. But for purposes of answering the written questions served on the President, and for purposes of answering questions at a deposition, the District Court ruled that the President must respond.

In mid-December 1997, the President answered one of the written discovery questions posed by Ms. Jones on this issue. When asked to identify all women who were state or federal employees and with whom he had had "sexual relations" since 1986,(7) the President answered under oath: "None."(8) For purposes of this interrogatory, the term "sexual relations" was not defined.

On January 17, 1998, President Clinton was questioned under oath about his relationships with other women in the workplace, this time at a deposition. Judge Wright presided over the deposition. The President was asked numerous questions about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky, by then a 24-year-old former White House intern, White House employee, and Pentagon employee. Under oath and in the presence of Judge Wright, the President denied that he had engaged in a "sexual affair," a "sexual relationship," or "sexual relations" with Ms. Lewinsky. The President also stated that he had no specific memory of having been alone with Ms. Lewinsky, that he remembered few details of any gifts they might have exchanged, and indicated that no one except his attorneys had kept him informed of Ms. Lewinsky's status as a potential witness in the Jones case.

The Investigation

On January 12, 1998, this Office received information that Monica Lewinsky was attempting to influence the testimony of one of the witnesses in the Jones litigation, and that Ms. Lewinsky herself was prepared to provide false information under oath in that lawsuit. The OIC was also informed that Ms. Lewinsky had spoken to the President and the President's close friend Vernon Jordan about being subpoenaed to testify in the Jones suit, and that Vernon Jordan and others were helping her find a job. The allegations with respect to Mr. Jordan and the job search were similar to ones already under review in the ongoing Whitewater investigation.(9)

After gathering preliminary evidence to test the information's reliability, the OIC presented the evidence to Attorney General Janet Reno. Based on her review of the information, the Attorney General determined that a further investigation by the Independent Counsel was required.

On the following day, Attorney General Reno petitioned the Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, on an expedited basis, to expand the jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr. On January 16, 1998, in response to the Attorney General's request, the Special Division issued an order that provides in pertinent part:

The Independent Counsel shall have jurisdiction and authority to investigate to the maximum extent authorized by the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994 whether Monica Lewinsky or others suborned perjury, obstructed justice, intimidated witnesses, or otherwise violated federal law other than a Class B or C misdemeanor or infraction in dealing with witnesses, potential witnesses, attorneys, or others concerning the civil case Jones v. Clinton.(10)

On January 28, 1998, after the allegations about the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky became public, the OIC filed a Motion for Limited Intervention and a Stay of Discovery in Jones v. Clinton. The OIC argued that the civil discovery process should be halted because it was having a negative effect on the criminal investigation. The OIC represented to the Court that numerous individuals then under subpoena in Jones, including Monica Lewinsky, were integral to the OIC's investigation, and that courts routinely stayed discovery in such circumstances.(11)

The next day Judge Wright responded to the OIC's motion. The Court ruled that discovery would be permitted to continue, except to the extent that it sought information about Monica Lewinsky. The Court acknowledged that "evidence concerning Monica Lewinsky might be relevant to the issues in [the Jones] case."(12) It concluded, however, that this evidence was not "essential to the core issues in this case," and that some of that evidence "might even be inadmissible."(13) The Court found that the potential value of this evidence was outweighed by the potential delay to the Jones case in continuing to seek discovery about Ms. Lewinsky.(14) The Court also was concerned that the OIC's investigation "could be impaired and prejudiced were the Court to permit inquiry into the Lewinsky matter by the parties in this civil case."(15)

On March 9, 1998, Judge Wright denied Ms. Jones's motion for reconsideration of the decision regarding Monica Lewinsky. The order states:

The Court readily acknowledges that evidence of the Lewinsky matter might have been relevant to plaintiff's case and, as she argues, that such evidence might possibly have helped her establish, among other things, intent, absence of mistake, motive, and habit on the part of the President. . . . Nevertheless, whatever relevance such evidence may otherwise have . . . it simply is not essential to the core issues in this case . . . .(16)

On April 1, 1998, Judge Wright granted President Clinton's motion for summary judgment, concluding that even if the facts alleged by Paula Jones were true, her claims failed as a matter of law.(17) Ms. Jones has filed an appeal, and as of the date of this Referral, the matter remains under consideration by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

After the dismissal of Ms. Jones's lawsuit, the criminal investigation continued. It was (and is) the view of this Office that any attempt to obstruct the proper functioning of the judicial system, regardless of the perceived merits of the underlying case, is a serious matter that warrants further inquiry. After careful consideration of all the evidence, the OIC has concluded that the evidence of wrongdoing is substantial and credible, and that the wrongdoing is of sufficient gravity that it warrants referral to Congress.(18)

The Significance of the Evidence of Wrongdoing

It is not the role of this Office to determine whether the President's actions warrant impeachment by the House and removal by the Senate; those judgments are, of course, constitutionally entrusted to the legislative branch.(19) This Office is authorized, rather, to conduct criminal investigations and to seek criminal prosecutions for matters within its jurisdiction.(20) In carrying out its investigation, however, this Office also has a statutory duty to disclose to Congress information that "may constitute grounds for an impeachment," a task that inevitably requires judgment about the seriousness of the acts revealed by the evidence.

From the beginning, this phase of the OIC's investigation has been criticized as an improper inquiry into the President's personal behavior; indeed, the President himself suggested that specific inquiries into his conduct were part of an effort to "criminalize my private life."(21) The regrettable fact that the investigation has often required witnesses to discuss sensitive personal matters has fueled this perception.

All Americans, including the President, are entitled to enjoy a private family life, free from public or governmental scrutiny. But the privacy concerns raised in this case are subject to limits, three of which we briefly set forth here.

First. The first limit was imposed when the President was sued in federal court for alleged sexual harassment. The evidence in such litigation is often personal. At times, that evidence is highly embarrassing for both plaintiff and defendant. As Judge Wright noted at the President's January 1998 deposition, "I have never had a sexual harassment case where there was not some embarrassment."(22) Nevertheless, Congress and the Supreme Court have concluded that embarrassment-related concerns must give way to the greater interest in allowing aggrieved parties to pursue their claims. Courts have long recognized the difficulties of proving sexual harassment in the workplace, inasmuch as improper or unlawful behavior often takes place in private.(23) To excuse a party who lied or concealed evidence on the ground that the evidence covered only "personal" or "private" behavior would frustrate the goals that Congress and the courts have sought to achieve in enacting and interpreting the Nation's sexual harassment laws. That is particularly true when the conduct that is being concealed -- sexual relations in the workplace between a high official and a young subordinate employee -- itself conflicts with those goals.

Second. The second limit was imposed when Judge Wright required disclosure of the precise information that is in part the subject of this Referral. A federal judge specifically ordered the President, on more than one occasion, to provide the requested information about relationships with other women, including Monica Lewinsky. The fact that Judge Wright later determined that the evidence would not be admissible at trial, and still later granted judgment in the President's favor, does not change the President's legal duty at the time he testified. Like every litigant, the President was entitled to object to the discovery questions, and to seek guidance from the court if he thought those questions were improper. But having failed to convince the court that his objections were well founded, the President was duty bound to testify truthfully and fully. Perjury and attempts to obstruct the gathering of evidence can never be an acceptable response to a court order, regardless of the eventual course or outcome of the litigation.

The Supreme Court has spoken forcefully about perjury and other forms of obstruction of justice:

In this constitutional process of securing a witness' testimony, perjury simply has no place whatever. Perjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings. Effective restraints against this type of egregious offense are therefore imperative.(24)

The insidious effects of perjury occur whether the case is civil or criminal. Only a few years ago, the Supreme Court considered a false statement made in a civil administrative proceeding: "False testimony in a formal proceeding is intolerable. We must neither reward nor condone such a 'flagrant affront' to the truth-seeking function of adversary proceedings. . . . Perjury should be severely sanctioned in appropriate cases."(25) Stated more simply, "[p]erjury is an obstruction of justice."(26)

Third. The third limit is unique to the President. "The Presidency is more than an executive responsibility. It is the inspiring symbol of all that is highest in American purpose and ideals."(27) When he took the Oath of Office in 1993 and again in 1997, President Clinton swore that he would "faithfully execute the Office of President."(28) As the head of the Executive Branch, the President has the constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."(29) The President gave his testimony in the Jones case under oath and in the presence of a federal judge, a member of a co-equal branch of government; he then testified before a federal grand jury, a body of citizens who had themselves taken an oath to seek the truth. In view of the enormous trust and responsibility attendant to his high Office, the President has a manifest duty to ensure that his conduct at all times complies with the law of the land.

In sum, perjury and acts that obstruct justice by any citizen -- whether in a criminal case, a grand jury investigation, a congressional hearing, a civil trial, or civil discovery -- are profoundly serious matters. When such acts are committed by the President of the United States, we believe those acts "may constitute grounds for an impeachment."

The Scope of the Referral

1. Background of the Investigation.
The link between the OIC's jurisdiction -- as it existed at the end of 1997 -- and the matters set forth in this Referral is complex but direct. In January 1998, Linda Tripp, a witness in three ongoing OIC investigations, came forward with allegations that: (i) Monica Lewinsky was planning to commit perjury in Jones v. Clinton, and (ii) she had asked Ms. Tripp to do the same. Ms. Tripp also stated that: (i) Vernon Jordan had counseled Ms. Lewinsky and helped her obtain legal representation in the Jones case, and (ii) at the same time, Mr. Jordan was helping Ms. Lewinsky obtain employment in the private sector.

OIC investigators and prosecutors recognized parallels between Mr. Jordan's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and his earlier relationship with a pivotal Whitewater-Madison figure, Webster L. Hubbell. Prior to January 1998, the OIC possessed evidence that Vernon Jordan -- along with other high-level associates of the President and First Lady -- helped Mr. Hubbell obtain lucrative consulting contracts while he was a potential witness and/or subject in the OIC's ongoing investigation. This assistance took place, moreover, while Mr. Hubbell was a target of a separate criminal investigation into his own conduct. The OIC also possessed evidence that the President and the First Lady knew and approved of the Hubbell-focused assistance.

Specifically, in the wake of his April 1994 resignation from the Justice Department, Mr. Hubbell launched a private consulting practice in Washington, D.C. In the startup process, Mr. Hubbell received substantial aid from important public and private figures. On the day prior to Mr. Hubbell announcing his resignation, White House Chief of Staff Thomas "Mack" McLarty attended a meeting at the White House with the President, First Lady, and others, where Mr. Hubbell's resignation was a topic of discussion.

At some point after the White House meeting, Mr. McLarty spoke with Vernon Jordan about Mr. Jordan's assistance to Mr. Hubbell. Mr. Jordan introduced Mr. Hubbell to senior executives at New York-based MacAndrews & Forbes Holding Co. Mr. Jordan is a director of Revlon, Inc., a company controlled by MacAndrews & Forbes. The introduction was successful; MacAndrews & Forbes retained Mr. Hubbell at a rate of $25,000 per quarter. Vernon Jordan informed President Clinton that he was helping Mr. Hubbell.(31)

By late 1997, this Office was investigating whether a relationship existed between consulting payments to Mr. Hubbell and his lack of cooperation (specifically, his incomplete testimony) with the OIC's investigation.(32) In particular, the OIC was investigating whether Mr. Hubbell concealed information about certain core Arkansas matters, namely, the much-publicized Castle Grande real estate project and related legal work by the Rose Law Firm, including the First Lady.

Against this background, the OIC considered the January 1998 allegations that: (i) Ms. Lewinsky was prepared to lie in order to benefit the President, and (ii) Vernon Jordan was assisting Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones litigation, while simultaneously helping her apply for a private-sector job with, among others, Revlon, Inc.

Based in part on these similarities, the OIC undertook a preliminary investigation. On January 15, 1998, this Office informed the Justice Department of the results of our inquiry. The Attorney General immediately applied to the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for an expansion of the OIC's jurisdiction. The Special Division granted this request and authorized the OIC to determine whether Monica Lewinsky or others had violated federal law in connection with the Jones v. Clinton case.

2. Current Status of the Investigation.
When the OIC's jurisdiction was expanded to cover the Lewinsky matter in January 1998, several matters remained under active investigation by this Office. Evidence was being gathered and evaluated on, among other things, events related to the Rose Law Firm's representation of Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association; events related to the firings in the White House Travel Office; and events related to the use of FBI files. Since the current phase of the investigation began, additional events arising from the Lewinsky matter have also come under scrutiny, including possible perjury and obstruction of justice related to former White House volunteer Kathleen Willey, and the possible misuse of the personnel records of Pentagon employee Linda Tripp.

From the outset, it was our strong desire to complete all phases of the investigation before deciding whether to submit to Congress information -- if any -- that may constitute grounds for an impeachment. But events and the statutory command of Section 595(c) have dictated otherwise. As the investigation into the President's actions with respect to Ms. Lewinsky and the Jones litigation progressed, it became apparent that there was a significant body of substantial and credible information that met the Section 595(c) threshold. As that phase of the investigation neared completion, it also became apparent that a delay of this Referral until the evidence from all phases of the investigation had been evaluated would be unwise. Although Section 595(c) does not specify when information must be submitted, its text strongly suggests that information of this type belongs in the hands of Congress as soon as the Independent Counsel determines that the information is reliable and substantially complete.

All phases of the investigation are now nearing completion. This Office will soon make final decisions about what steps to take, if any, with respect to the other information it has gathered. Those decisions will be made at the earliest practical time, consistent with our statutory and ethical obligations.

The Contents of the Referral

The Referral consists of several parts. Part One is a Narrative. It begins with an overview of the information relevant to this investigation, then sets forth that information in chronological sequence. A large part of the Narrative is devoted to a description of the President's relationship with Monica Lewinsky. The nature of the relationship was the subject of many of the President's false statements, and his desire to keep the relationship secret provides a motive for many of his actions that apparently were designed to obstruct justice.

The Narrative is lengthy and detailed. It is the view of this Office that the details are crucial to an informed evaluation of the testimony, the credibility of witnesses, and the reliability of other evidence. Many of the details reveal highly personal information; many are sexually explicit. This is unfortunate, but it is essential. The President's defense to many of the allegations is based on a close parsing of the definitions that were used to describe his conduct. We have, after careful review, identified no manner of providing the information that reveals the falsity of the President's statements other than to describe his conduct with precision.

Part Two of the Referral is entitled "Information that May Constitute Grounds for An Impeachment." This "Grounds" portion of the Referral summarizes the specific evidence that the President lied under oath and attempted to obstruct justice. This Part is designed to be understandable if read without the Narrative, although the full context in which the potential grounds for impeachment arise can best be understood if considered against the backdrop of information set forth in Part One.

Several volumes accompany the Referral. The Appendix contains relevant court orders, tables, a discussion of legal and evidentiary issues, background information on the Jones litigation, a diagram of the Oval Office, and other reference material. We next set forth a series of "Document Supplements," which attempt to provide some of the most important support material in an accessible format. Document Supplement A contains transcripts of the President's deposition testimony and grand jury testimony; Document Supplement B contains transcripts of Monica Lewinsky's testimony and interview statements. Document Supplements C, D, and E set forth the full text of the documents cited in the Referral. Although every effort has been made to provide full and accurate quotations of witnesses in their proper context, we urge review of the full transcripts of the testimony cited below.

1. Section 595(c) of Title 28 of the United States Code is part of the Ethics in Government Act. The section provides:

(c) Information relating to impeachment. -- An independent counsel shall advise the House of Representatives of any substantial and credible information which such independent counsel receives, in carrying out the independent counsel's responsibilities under this chapter, that may constitute grounds for an impeachment. Nothing in this chapter or section 49 of this title [concerning the assignment of judges to the Special Division that appoints an independent counsel] shall prevent the Congress or either House thereof from obtaining information in the course of an impeachment proceeding.

2. Ms. Jones also named Arkansas State Trooper Danny Ferguson as a defendant. For a detailed background of the Jones v. Clinton lawsuit, see the accompanying Appendix, Tab C.

3. In 1991, Ms. Jones was an employee of the Arkansas Industrial Development Corporation. Ms. Jones alleged that while at work at a meeting at the Excelsior Hotel that day, she was invited into a hotel room with Governor Clinton, and that once she was there, the Governor exposed his genitals and asked her to perform oral sex on him. Ms. Jones alleged that she suffered various job detriments after refusing Governor Clinton's advances. This Referral expresses no view on the factual or legal merit, or lack thereof, of Ms. Jones's claims.

4. Jones v. Clinton, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1652 (1997).

5. The purpose of discovery in a civil lawsuit is "to allow a broad search for facts, the names of witnesses, or any other matters which may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his case." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes (1946). The discovery process allows the parties to obtain from their respective opponents written answers to interrogatories, oral testimony in depositions under oath, documents, and other tangible items so long as the information sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

6. 921-DC-00000461 (Dec. 11, 1997 Order at 3). Similarly, in a December 18, 1997 Order, Judge Wright noted that "the issue [was] one of discovery, not admissibility of evidence at trial. Discovery, as all counsel know, by its very nature takes unforeseen twists and turns and goes down numerous paths, and whether those paths lead to the discovery of admissible evidence often simply cannot be predetermined." 1414-DC-00001012-13 (Dec. 18, 1997 Order at 7-8).

7. V002-DC-00000020 (President Clinton's Responses to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories at 5).

8. V002-DC-00000053 (President Clinton's Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories at 2). During discovery in a civil lawsuit, the parties must answer written questions ("interrogatories") that are served on them by their opponent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33. The answering party must sign a statement under penalty of perjury attesting to the truthfulness of the answers. Id.

9. For a brief discussion of the scope of the OIC's jurisdiction, see "The Scope of the Referral," below.

10. The full text of the Special Division's Order is set forth in the Appendix, Tab A.

11. Jones v. Clinton, Motion of the United States for Limited Intervention and a Stay of Discovery, at 6. The overlap in the proceedings was significant. Witnesses called before the grand jury in the criminal investigation had been subpoenaed by both parties to the civil case; defendant's counsel had subpoenaed information from the OIC; and the plaintiff's attorneys had subpoenaed documents directly related to the criminal matter.

12. Jones v. Clinton, Order, Jan. 29, 1998, at 2.

13. Id.

14. Id. at 2-3.

15. Id. at 3.

16. Jones v. Clinton, 993 F. Supp. 1217, 1222 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (footnote and emphasis omitted).

17. Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 679 (E.D. Ark. 1998).

18. In the course of its investigation, the OIC gathered information from a variety of sources, including the testimony of witnesses before the grand jury. Normally a federal prosecutor is prohibited by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure from disclosing grand jury material, unless it obtains permission from a court or is otherwise authorized by law to do so. This Office concluded that the statutory obligation of disclosure imposed on an Independent Counsel by 28 U.S.C. §595(c) grants such authority. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the OIC obtained permission from the Special Division to disclose grand jury material as appropriate in carrying out its statutory duty. A copy of the disclosure order entered by the Special Division is set forth in the Appendix, Tab B. We also advised Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson, who supervises the principal grand jury in this matter, of our determination on that issue.

19. U.S. Const., art. I, § 2, cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cl. 6.

20. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a).

21. Before the grand jury, the President refused to answer certain questions about his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky on the ground that he believed the inquiries were unnecessary "and . . . I think, frankly, go too far in trying to criminalize my private life." Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 94.

Others have argued that alleged "lies about sex" have nothing to do with the President's performance in office, and thus, are inconsequential. Former White House Counsel Jack Quinn articulated this view:

This is a matter of sex between consenting adults, and the question of whether or not one or the other was truthful about it. . . . This doesn't go to the question of his conduct in office. And, in that sense, it's trivial.

John F. Harris, "In Political Washington, A Confession Consensus," Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1998, at A1 (quoting Quinn's statement on CBS's "Face the Nation").

The President echoed this theme in his address to the Nation on August 17, 1998, following his grand jury testimony:

. . . I intend to reclaim my family life for my family. It's nobody's business but ours. Even Presidents have private lives. It is time to stop the pursuit of personal destruction and the prying into private lives and get on with our national life.

Testing of a President: In His Own Words, Last Night's Address, The New York Times, Aug. 18, 1998, at A12.

22. Clinton 1/17/98 Depo. at 9. As two commentators have noted: "[T]o the extent that discovery is permitted with respect to the sexual activities of either the complainant or the alleged harasser, courts likely will freely entertain motions to limit the availability of such information to the parties and their counsel and to prohibit general dissemination of such sensitive data to third parties." See Barbara Lindeman & David D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment in Employment Law 563 (1992).

23. A sexual harassment case can sometimes boil down to a credibility battle between the parties, in which "the existence of corroborative evidence or the lack thereof is likely to be crucial." Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 912 n.25 (11th Cir. 1982). If there are no eyewitnesses, it can be critical for a plaintiff to learn in discovery whether the defendant has committed the same kind of acts before or since. Thus, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission explained in a 1990 policy statement that the plaintiff's allegations of an incident of sexual harassment "would be further buttressed if other employees testified that the supervisor propositioned them as well." EEOC Policy Guidance (1990). The rules of evidence establish that such corroboration may be used to show the defendant's "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). In short, a defendant's sexual history, at least with respect to other employees, is ordinarily discoverable in a sexual harassment suit.

24. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1975) (plurality opinion).

25. ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 323 (1994).

26. United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937). There is occasional misunderstanding to the effect that perjury is somehow distinct from "obstruction of justice." While the crimes are distinct, they are in fact variations on a single theme: preventing a court, the parties, and the public from discovering the truth. Perjury, subornation of perjury, concealment of subpoenaed documents, and witness tampering are all forms of obstruction of justice.

27. See Eugene Lyons, Herbert Hoover: A Biography 337 (1964) (quoting Hoover).

28. U.S. Const., art. II, § 1, cl. 8.

29. U.S. Const., art. II, § 3; see also George Washington, Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1793:

Previous to the execution of any official act of the President the Constitution requires an oath of office. This oath I am now about to take, and in your presence: That if it shall be found during my administration of the Government I have in any instance violated willingly or knowingly the injunctions thereof, I may (besides incurring constitutional punishment) be subject to the upbraidings of all who are now witnesses of the present solemn ceremony.

Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 82-540, at 4 (1954).

30. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653-54 (Jackson, J., concurring).

31. Jordan, House Testimony, 7/24/97, at 46.

32. From April through November 1994, 17 different persons or entities retained Mr. Hubbell as a consultant. In 1994, he collected $450,010 for this work. In 1995, he collected $91,750, despite beginning a 28-month prison term in August of that year.